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Record No. 1905 
THE CITY OF PETERSBURG, Appellant, 
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GENERAI.J BAKING COMPANY,- INCORPORATED, 
Appellee. 
PETITION IPOR WRIT OF ERROR AND SUPERSEDEAS 
To the Honorable Judges of the 81tpreme Court of Appeals 
of Virginia: 
Your petitioner, the City of Petersburg, a municipal cor· 
poration within the State of Virginia, respectfully represents 
that it is aggrieved by an order of the Hustings Court of the 
City of Petersburg, entered on the 3rd day of May, 1937, 
granting the application of the General Baking Company, In-
corporated, for relief from an alleged erroneous assessment 
of a local license tax imposed by the City of Petersburg and 
exonerating the said company from the payment thereof. A 
transcript of the record of the proceedings in the Court be-
low is presented with this petition. 
THE PROCEEDINGS. 
The petition for relief was filed in due time, on July 8, 1935, 
under Section 414 of the Tax Code of the State of Virginia 
(R., pp. 2, 3, 4 and 5). The city filed its· answer, asserting its 
right to impose the tax (R., pp. 5 and 6). Upon the petition 
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and answer and upon the admitted facts, the order granting 
the relief was entered (R., pp. 6, 7 and 8). 
THE FACTS. 
·The Court below certified that the· facts proved are those 
alleged in the first, second, third and :fifth paragraphs of the 
application. These allegations are admitted by the answer 
to be true. These facts, in brief, are as follows: The appli-
cant is a New York corporation, authorized to do business in 
the State of Virginia, and owns and operates a manufactur-
ing plant in the City of N otfolk, where it produces and manu-
factures bakery products which it sells in Norfolk and else-
where in the State of Virginia, including the City of Peters-
burg, and, as such, it is taxable on capital by the State of Vir-
ginia. The bread and cakes sold ·by it in the City of Peters-
burg are family supplies of a perishable nature, produced 
by the applicant and not purchased by it for sale, and are 
shipped daily from its establishment in Norfolk to the City 
of Richmond in its own trucks and there transferred to 
smaller trucks owned bythe applicant and operated by its 
own agents and employees, who bring such products .to the 
City of Petersburg, where they are carried from place to 
place, and offered for sale and sold and delivered at the thne 
of sale from such trucks directly to the consumers in that 
city: The applicant does not keep a regular place of busi-
ness in the City of Petersburg, open at all times in reglilar 
business hours and at the same place. The applicant was 
accordingly assessed with a license tax of $150.00 under an 
ordinance of the City of Petersburg, adopted December 18, 
1934, which ordinance is set out on pages three and four of 
·the record. This ordinance provides that all persons, firms 
or corporations· engaged in the occupation or business named· 
therein, for the year 1935 and for each year thereafter, shall 
obtain from the Commissioner of the Revenue a license for the· 
s~me, the. annual tax on which shall be assessed and collected-
at the time the license is issued, at the rates named, and paid· 
on or before the :first day of .January of each year. The or-
dinance then imposes a specific tax upon those who keep . ·a· 
regular place of busines~ within the city, open at all times in 
regular business hours and at the same place, who carry from 
place to place and, elsewhere than at such regular place of 
business, offer for sale or sell, and at the time ·of sale, deliver, 
certain products, including bread and cakes, to dealers ··or 
consumers . within the city. The second section of the or..:1 
dinance, referring specifically to those who are in the Class· 
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of the &pplicant here, that is, those who do not keep a regu-
lar place .of business in the city, is as follows: 
"2. All p~rsons, firms, or corporations, who do not keep a 
regular place of business in this . city, open at all times in 
regular business hours and at the same place, who shall carry 
from place to place and, personally or through their agents, 
offer for sale or sell, and, at the time of such sale, deliver, 
bread, cakes, pies, ice cr~am and/or confectionery products 
to dealers or consumers in the city, shall pay a specific license 
tax of $150.00, regardless of whether such person, firm or cor-
poration has been taxed on capital by the State of Virginia. 
No pro rata. Not transferable." 
Penalties for failure to comply with the provisions of the 
ordinance are prescribed, and the general provisions of the 
license ordinan~e of the city, so far as applicable and not in 
conflict with this ordinance, are regarded as having been in-
corporated therein. 
The applicant declined to pay the license tax imposed by 
the ordinance for the year 1935 for the reasons set out in 
Section four of the appliGation (R., p. 4). It is admitted that 
the assessment was n-ot caused by the wilful failure or re-
fusal of the applicant to furnish the tax assessing authority 
with the necessary information as required by law. No effo1~t 
was made to enforce the penalty, it being understood and 
agreed between the city and the applicant that the Court 
should pass upon the right of the city to assess the tax, with-
out invoking the fourth section of the ordinance relating to 
penalties. 
ARGU!!ENT. 
The application, Section four (R~, p, 4) ttll(lges that the 
assessment is erroneous and invalid and a$ai~·ns as the fil'St 
reason for declining to pny the··sam~ that the city is witho·nt 
charter power to enact such an ordinance int:~ofar a.s it affects 
the applicant, and as the second Teason, that the city was, by 
reason of the provisions of Sections 192 and 192 (b) of the 
State Tax Code, prohibited from in1posing suCJb a license tax 
upon the applicant. These two grounds for relief will be dis-
cuss~d together. 
The Enaotment of the Ordinarwe ·is Within the Charter Power 
of the City of Petersbur,q. 
The charter of the City of Petersburg, as provided by an 
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act of the General Assembly of Virginia, approved March 11, 
1875 (.Acts of 1874-75, page 143), contains the following· sec-
tiO'll under Chapter IV (page 156 of the Acts): 
''The common council may grant or refuse licenses, and 
n1ay require taxes to be paid on such licenses to agents of 
insurance companies, whose principal office is not located in 
said city; to auctioneers, to public theatrical or other per-
formances, or .shows; to keepers of billiard tables, ten-pin 
alleys and pistol galleries; to hawkers and peddlers in the 
city, or to persons to sell goods by sample therein; to agents 
for the sale or renting of real estate; to commission nler-
chants, and all other business which cannot be reached by 
the ad valore·m system under the preceding section. They 
may also grant or refuse such license to all sellers of wine 
or spirituous or fermented liquors, and require taxes to be 
paid for such license, in addition to other taxes imposed.'' 
This provision of the charter was in effect between that 
date and 1935, and is still in effect. Under it the city has 
the right to grant or refuse licenses to peddlers and to re-
quire taxes to be paid thereon. When the charter of the city 
was enacted in 1875, the word "peddler" had a well defined 
meaning in the law of Virginia. Section 27 of Chapter XXXIV 
of the Code of Virginia of 1873 (page 329) provided in part 
as follows: 
''Any person who shall carry from place to place any goods, 
wares or 1nerchandise, and offer to sell or barter the same, 
or actually sell or barter the same, ·in transitu or otherwise, 
shall be deemed a peddler; and any person licensed as a 
peddler may sell any personal property a merchant may sell, 
or he may exchange the same for other articles; and when-
ever a license is granted to a peddler to sell such goods, 
wares or merchandise, his li~ense shall confer authority to 
sell at any house or place within the county or corporation 
in which the license was granted.'' 
This statutory definition fixed by the existing Code will 
be read into the charter of the City of Petersburg enacted 
shortly after the Code of 1873 went into effect. The Gen-
eral Assembly will be presumed to have enacted the law 
providing the charter with this statutory definition before 
it. This same definition of a peddler, omitting the words "in. 
transit~t or otherwise", is found today in Section 192 of the 
Tax Code of Virg'inia. Therefore, the City of Petersburg 
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h~s the right, unless such right has been denied it by some ef-
fective legislation passed after the enactn1ent of the city char-
ter, to grant or refuse licenses and to require taxes to be paid 
on such licenses to any person who shall carry from place 
to place any goods, wares or merchandise and offer to sell 
or barter the same, or actually sell or barter the same. And 
under the admitted facts here, this is just exactly what the 
applicant is doing within the City of Petersburg. 
The .Applicant is a Peddler Unde.r the Statutory Definition of 
That H1 o1·d. 
The applicant, having in mind probably the itinerant mer-
chant, who at one time walked the. ~.ountry roads or city· 
streets with a pack on his back, will say that it is not a 
peddler. But if it carries its goods from place to place and 
offers to sell the same, or actually sells the same, and at the 
time of such sale, makes delivery of them, as it is admitted 
is the case here, it is no less a peddler because it uses a modern 
method of transportation and delivers its goods from a truck 
rather than from a pack. As was said in 29 C. J., page 221, 
Note 6 (b): 
"One is a peddler whether he carries his goods in a pack 
on his back or on horseback or in a wag·on, cart, sleigh, steam-
boat or canal boat (citing cases). The distinctive feature 
does not consist in the mode of transportation, though one 
of the statutory modes is essential to constitute a peddler. 
A man carrying goods in a motor van and selling them from 
place to place en route is a peddler or a hawker." · 
Other definitions are found in the text of 29 C. J. at pages 
219, 220 and 222, and the accepted· definition from the au-
thorities there cited is that a peddler is one who carries his 
merchandise with him, travelling from place to place, or fron1 
house to house, exposing his goods for sale and selling them. 
It is contemplated that he has no fixed place of dealing, but 
travels from place to place, or from house to house. The 
kind of n1erchandise sold is not important. He is a peddler, 
whether he walks or whether he rides, and whether he rides 
in a cart or an automobile or a steamboat. 
In 21. R. C. L., at page 181, it is said that a peddler may 
adopt any one or more methods of transportation, and yet 
remain a peddler, the fact of locomotion being important, but 
the mode being entirely immaterial. The modern definition 
of a peddler is one. who goes from place to place and fro1n 
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house to house, carrying for sale, and exposing to sale, good~, 
wares and merchandise which he carries. 
Under these definitions, and particularly under the statu-
tory definition of Virginia, there can be no question but that 
the applicant here is a peddler. 
It is true that the Code of 1873, Chapter 35, Section 22, 
page 355, provided that no resident n1echanic or manufacturer, 
with certain irrelevant exceptions, should be taxed for the 
privilege of peddling or bartering- articles manufactured by 
himself in this State. But the General Baking Company, In-
~ corporated, is a reside!1t of the State of New York. This pro-
vision does not seen1 to have been carried into the present 
Code of Virginia. But the present Code, in Section 2383-A, 
·does provide that any person, firm or corporation licensed to 
manufacture in any city, town or county in this State, shall 
be entitled to sell and deliver in any manner the goods so 
manufactured to a.ny licensed dealer anywhere in this State 
withQut tlie payment of any additional tax in any forn1 to any 
city, town or county. But this applicant is selling its products 
directly to consumers in the City of Petersburg and not to 
licensed dealers, and it does not keep a regular place of busi-
ness in the city, as ·will appear from the application. The city, 
therefore, is receiving no license from the applicant in any 
form, although it is in direct competition with the licensed 
dealers in bread and cakes within the city. 
The right of the State to delegate to the City of Peters-
burg·, as a part of its police and taxing power, the right to 
regulate and to tax peddlers is clear. See 21 R. C. L. 191. 
Section 192 of the Tax Code contemplates this. This the 
State has done in the charter of the City of Petersburg. But 
the applicant, in its petition, says that notwithstanding this 
delegation of power, the city, by reason of the provisions· of 
Sections 192 and 192 (b) of the Tax Code, is prohibited from 
imposing such a license tax on the applicant. 
Section 192 of the Tax Code defines peddlers in the Ian~ 
guage of the Code of 1873, with the omission noted above. 
It then divides peddlers into two classes: First, those who 
do not keep a regular place of business, and, second, those 
who do. It is then provided that this section shall not apply 
to those who sell or offer for sale, in person or by their em-
ployees, ice, wood, meats, milk, butter, eggs, poultry, fish, oys.:. 
ters, gatne, vegetables, fruits, or other family supplies of a 
perishable nature grown or produced by them and not pur-
chased by them for sale. Such persons are none the less 
peddlers, but they are excepted from the application of the 
State law defining peddlers because, we may presume, of the 
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nature of the things which they sell. And then the following 
provision is found in Section 192: 
'' ThP. councils or other governing bodies of cities and towns 
may also, by ordinance or ordinances, classify peddlers for 
the purpose of city or town license taxation, and may impose 
upon each class the same or different rates of tax, except no 
license tax may be imposed directly or indirectly upon those 
exempted from a State license by this section.'' 
It is by virtue of this language quoted above that the ap-
plicant claims to be exempt from the license tax imp~osed by 
the citv. 
It is"' admitted that under the decision of this Court in Corby 
Baking Company v. The Corwtn0111wea.lth, 123 Virginia 10, 
bread was held to be a family supply of a perishable nature. 
It is true that the bread sold by the applicant here is pro-
duced. by it and not purchased for sale. But in the Corby 
case, the baking company, a domestic corporation, had its 
principal place of business in the City of Richmond, where 
the bread was sold, and it was sought to subject it to a State 
peddler's license tax upon its delivery wagons owned aud 
used bv it in connection with its business. This Court did not 
say that the baking company was not a peddler, but that 
because bread came within the designation of other family 
supplies of a perishable nature, the tax could not be imposed, 
such things being expressly exempted under the very act 
which i~posed the State tax. And if the Corby case is con-
trolling at all here, it is controlling only upon that question. 
It does not hold that a city cannot impose a license tax upon 
a manufacturer who has no place of business ·within the city, 
who pays no taxes therein, but who brings -its products into 
the city and sells them to consum~rs in competition with local 
bakeries and merchants. And it is not to be presumed that 
the General Assembly in enacting Section 192 of the Tax 
Code, and by inserting therein a clause by way of an exccl)-
tion, intende~ any such unfair consequences upon those cities 
. to which it had granted the right to levy the tax. None of 
the articles mentioned in Section 192 are manufactured ar-
ticles, unless ice and butter might be so regarded. They are 
such thing·s as are produced on farms and taken from public 
waters. Practically all goods which are edible are family sup-
plieF~ of a more or less perishable nature. Under the construc-
tion of this section for which the applicant would contend, it 
'vould have to concede that a milling· company producing flour 
or meal, a sugar refinery producing .sugar, a packer producing 
lard could send their trucks into the city and sell their pro-
---~ 
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ducts directly to the consumer in competition with local mer-
chants without the payment of any license tax to the city. 
Surely n~ such consequences as this were ever contemplated. 
Section 2383-a of the Code of Virginia was intended to limit 
the rights of manufacturers with respect to the sale of their 
products and if they are sold to licensed dealers, as this sec-
tion provides they may be, the city receives a revenue from 
such dealers and no unfair competition is permitted. 
Section 192 (b) of the Tax Code refers to those persons, 
firms or corporations, with certain exceptions, who or which 
peddle goods, wares or merchandise by selling and delivering 
the sam~ at the same tin1e to licensed dealers or retailers at 
other than a definite place of business operated by the seller. 
Such persons, firn1s or corporations are expressly defined as 
peddlers. By such definition we get away from that narrow 
concept of peddlers for which the applicant would contend. 
But this section has no other bearing upon the case now before 
the Court. 
But to return to Section 192 of the Tax Code, if we were 
to concede (as we do not) that, under the lang"Uage of this 
section which prohibits cities generally from imposing a li-
cense tax upon those who are exe1npted from a State license 
tax, by its provisions, cities generally could not impose a li-
cense tax upon a non-resident baker who has no place of 
business therein and pays no tax to such city, but which sells 
bread and cakes to consumers in such city in competition with 
local merchants and bakeries, it does not follow that the City 
of Petersburg, under its charter provisions, has no rig·ht to 
impose such a license tax as is imposed by the ordinance in 
question. 
By an Act of the General Assembly of Virginia, approved 
April 16, 1903 (Acts 1902, 3, 4, page 1.87), peddlers were de-
fined in the same language now employed in Section 192 of 
the Tax Code. It was provided that this section, so defining 
peddlers, should not apply to those who sell or offer for sale, 
in person or by their employees, ice, fuel, meafs, foul, fish, 
game, vegetables, fruits, or other family supplies of a per-
ishable nature, grown or produced by them. The specific 
license provided in this act was the sum of $250.00 for each 
person so engaged or employed when he travelled on foot, 
and $500.00 when he peddled other than on foot, with certain 
exceptions. The· Revenue Act of 1903, of which this was a 
part, concluded with the provision (page 228) that all acts 
and parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions of this act 
were therebv repealed. However, this general provision did 
not affect the charter of the City of Petersburg. 
Later, at the same session of the General Assembly (Acts 
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1902, 3 and 4, page 484), Section 50 of the Revenue Act was 
again amended, but the same definitions and exceptions were 
retained and an additional exception added, which is not rele-
vant here. The provisions of the tax la'v with regard to 
peddlers was again amended in 1908 (Acts of 1908, page 124). 
Here the same distinctions between those 'vho travelled on 
foot and those who peddled otherwise than on foot was made 
and specific license taxes imposed upon the several classes of 
peddlers named, exempting, however, farmers peddling farm 
products, wood or charcoal grown or produced by them. 
Sections 50 and 51 of the Revenue Act referring to peddlers 
were again amended in 1914 (Acts of 1914, page 490). This 
act retained the ~arne definitions and practically the same 
exceptions. Sections 50 and 51 were again amended in 1915 
(Acts of 1915, page 237). The same definitions were retained 
and the chang~es made are not material here. Section 50, de-. 
fining peddlers, was amended in 1916 (Acts of 1916, page 
772), but the changes made are not material to this case. The 
Act of 1932 (Acts of 1932, page 348) retained the definition of 
peddlers and the other essential features of former acts, but 
added thP. prohibition as to the imposition by cities and towns 
of license taxes upon those exempted from a State license tax 
by Section 192. This was new, and up to 1932 there had 
been no such prohibition on the rights of cities or towns. 
This exception was carried into the 1933 amendment (Acts 
of 1933, page 7 4). 
It is the contention of the appellant here that the 1932 Act 
which provided that no license tax might be imposed, directly 
or indirectly, upon those exempted fron1 the State license tax 
by the same act, did not deprive the City of Petersburg of its 
right, under its charter, to impose a license tax on peddlers 
within the city. 
Municipal corporations are creatures of the States and 
their charters are not contracts, and the right of the Legis-
lature to repeal, alter or amend such charters and to withdraw 
from such corporations the right to tax certain subjects is 
admitted. But until repealed or amended in some effective 
'vay such n1unicipal charters remain in effect. The grant of 
power to the City of Petersburg· was by a special act of the 
General Assembly of Virginia, passed in 1875. It was not 
repealed by the enactn1ent of Section 192 of the Tax Code, 
a general law passed in 1932, and the right to impose the 
tax is not affected by that general enactment. 
Section 437 of the Tax Code of Virginia expressly provides: 
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''No sections of the Code of Virginia, or amendments 
thereof, and no acts of Assembly, or amendments thereof, are 
repealed by the Tax Code of Virginia except such sections and 
acts as are specifically repealed hereby.'' 
While Section 436 of the Tax Code did repeal certain sec-
tions of the Code of Virginia and acts of the General Assem-
bly, it did not repeal, alter or amend the charter of the City 
of Petersburg, an act of the General Assembly. 
The Tax Code of Virginia is one act and each part is a 
part of the whole, and Section 192, which the applicant here 
contends repeals that section of the charter of the city re-
ferred to above, must be read in connection with Sections 
436 and 437, and when so considered, Section 192 does not 
affect the provisions of the charter of the City of Peters-
burg, these provisions of the charter being preserved by Sec-
tion 437 just as effectively as if Section 192 had expressly 
preserved the rig·hts of cities under existing charters. 
If the General Assen1bly of Virginia had desired to amend 
the charter of the City of Petersburg, it could have done so. 
But instead of amending that charter, it expressly continued 
it in force by virtue of Section 437 of the Tax Code. And 
when in 1932 it linuted the powers of cities generally, with 
respect to imposing the license tax on those exempted from 
State license taxes, having before it the charter of the city 
which had been in effect fifty-eight years, and having before 
it Section 437 of the Tax Code preserving that charter, it made 
no attempt to an1end the charter or to limit the right and 
power of the city, and its failure to do so further preserve the 
rights of the city under its charter. 
Section 6567 of the Code of Virginia, which repealed acts 
of a general natu1·e in force at the tin1e of the adoption of the 
code, did not affect the special act which provided a charter 
for the City of Petersburg. 
Under Section 64 of the Constitution of Virginia the amend-
ment of Section 192· of the Tax Code by the Act of 1932 did 
not operate, directly or indirectly, to enact, and did not have 
the effect of the enactment of, a special, private or local 
law. Consequently, the amendment of Section 192 did not 
affect the amendment of the special law which provided the 
charter for the City of Petersburg. 
1\'[oreover, Section 117 of the Constitution of Virginia ex-
pressly provides that each of the cities and towns of the State, 
having at the time of the adoption of the Constitution a mu-
nicipal charter, may retain the same, except so far as it 
shall he repealed or amended by the General Assembly, pro-
vided that every such charter is amended to conform to the 
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provisions, restrictions, limitations, and powers set forth in 
Article VIII or otherwise provided in the Constitution. 
In Powm·s v. Richrnond, 122 Virginia 328, at page 338, this 
Court says: 
''Many charters existed in Virginia at the time the new 
Constitution was adopted, and many of them had and still 
have special provisions; and Section 117 of the Constitution 
was clearly intended to continue all such special acts, except 
insofar as they were repealed by the Constitution or by the 
General Assembly. In addition to this, Section 1 of the sched-
ule of the Constitution (Code 1904, p. cclxxiii) expressly pre-
serves all existing statutes which are neither repugnant to 
the Constitution nor expressly repealed.'' 
In the case last cited above, this Court, after setting out 
the provisions of Section 117 of the Constitution, quotes from 
the decision of this Oourt in Standard Oil Cornpany v. The 
City of Fredericksburg, 105 Virginia 87, in which the city as-
sessed a license tax upon an oil company by virtue of au-
thority under its charter, as follows: 
''The power of the city to levy the licenses in these two 
cases is denied, because, since the State exacts no such li-
cense, and since Section 168 of the Constitution provides that 
the license tax 'shall be levied and collected under general 
laws', that if the .city ever had the power under its charter, 
that power is taken away by Section 117 of the Constitution, 
which amends the charter of the city to conform to Section 
168 of the Constitution, and that such a license could be re-
quired only under general law thereto especially authorizing 
all the cities of the Commonwealth to levy such a license tax. 
''This contention has been decided against the plaintiff 
company by the Supreme rourt of Appeals of ·virginia in 
Hicks v. Br·istol, 102 Va. 861, 47 S. E. 1001, and in Arey v. 
Lindsay, 103 Va. 250, 48 S. E. 889. In this latter case the 
court says: 'There is no indication. of a purpose to repeal 
existing· laws, valid when passed, whether special enactment 
or otherwise '. 
''The n1anifest purpose of the authors of the Constitution 
'was to meet and obviate the evils attending the passage of 
special acts' and that 'the Constitution did not intend to 
abrogate a charter or any part of it', because it had been 
passed as a 'special act, but only such features of the char-
ter _as were in conflict with the Constitution, and to forbid 
special acts in the future'.'' 
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The charter of the City of "Petersburg, being thus expressly 
preserved, will not be regarded as repealed or amended by 
implication nor by any inconsistent provision of a general 
statute, a section of the Tax Code, the effect of which wa~. 
expressly limited by another provision of that code. 
Section 117 of the Constitution further provides that the 
General Assembly may, by general law or by special act 
(passed in the manner provided in Article IV of the Consti-
tution), provide for the organization of government of cities 
and towns. And this Court, in 1.1!/iller v. l>ulaski, 109 ·virginia · 
142, said: 
"VVe are of opinion that it is within the power of the leg-
islature to amend the charter of a municipal corporation if 
it pursues the mode provided in Article IV of the Consti-
tution, and the special act is passed by a recorded vote of two-
thirds of the members elected to each house, as provided by 
Section 117." 
Of course, there is no contention here that the charter of 
the City of'Petersburg was amended by any such method. 
Section 63 of the Constitution of Virginia was referred to 
by counsel for the applicant in the Court below. While this 
section does provide that the General Assembly shall not 
enact any local, special or private law for the assessment and 
collection of taxes, with an exception which is not pertinent 
here, the charter of the City of Petersburg was enacted long 
before the adoption of the present Constitution and Section 
117 of the Constitution expressly preserved the municipal 
charters of cities and towns, except insofar as such charters 
should be repealed or amended by the General Assembly, and 
then proceeded to provide how such amendments might b~ 
passed. 
In Chambe.rs v. The City of Roanoke, 114 Virginia 766, & 
farmer 'vho had brought a wagon load of produce from his 
farm into the City of Roanoke for sale and stopped on the 
side of the street and outside the market-house and sheds~ 
On his refusal to pay the curbage tax under the City or-
dinance, he was fined. This was in 1911. By an Act of the 
General Assembly, approved in 1896, it was declared to be un-
lawful for any city to impose or collect any tax, fine or other 
penalty upon any person selling farm produce within the city 
outside of and not within the regular market-houses and sheds 
of such cities. Therefore, under this general law the city 
had no right to demand any tax. But in 1898, the charter of 
the City of Roanoke was amended and the council was given 
the authority to confine the sale of farm produce to the public 
~ 
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market and public squares and the right to levy and collect 
th~ license tax and impose a curbage tax on each wagon or 
other vehicle containing farm produce brought into the city 
and offered for sale. Thereupon, the common council passed 
an ordinance imposing the curbage tax authorized by the 
amendment. The statute and the amendment of the charter 
were repugnant. The prior statute applied to all of the 
cities and towns of· the State, while the latter applied to the 
City of Roanoke alone. .The latter statute was held to be a 
qualified amendn1ent of the general law. The charter was 
held to have been left intact, and the ordinance passed In 
pursuance thereof was a valid exercise of the municipal 
power. There was a conflict between a ·general and a special 
statute and the special statute governed. In Fonticello Com-
pany v. Richmond, 147 Virginia 355, the case of Chambers .v. 
The City of Roanoke is cited with approval. In the Fonti-
cello case the language of the city charter was slightly in con-
flict with the language of Section 4363 of the code and it. was 
held that the charter, to the extent of such conflict, superseded 
the provisions of the general statute so far as they related to 
the City of Richmond. 
In Commonwealth v. Rose, 160 Virginia 177, this Court said: 
''General laws are superseded by later charter provisions, 
which are themselves statutes, to the extent that there is a 
conflict, ' ' 
citing the two cases referred to next above. 
In Comrnonwealth v. Richmond and Petersbur,q Railroad 
Company, -81 Virginia, at page 367, this Court said: 
"The principles applicable to the repeal of statutes by 
implication are few and simple. The general rule, laid down 
'in Gregory's case, 6 Coke, 19 b, and, so .far as known, univer-
sally accepted as correct, is that 'a later statute in the affirma-. 
tive shall not take away a former act, and eo potius, if the 
former be particular and the latter general'. And it is said 
that this rule is enforced more rigidly when the attempt is 
made, by a later gene·ral law, to repeal the provisions of"a 
prior special charter, than in any other class of cases,'' 
citing cases from several jurisdictions. 
In the case of Trehy v. Marie, 100 ·virginia, at page 43, ·it 
appeared that by an act approved in 1898, the general law 
contained -in Sections 717 and 718 of the code, relating to 
fines and costs before justices of the peace, was amended and · 
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reenacted, and all acts or parts of acts in conflict therewith 
were repealed. It was contended that this act repealed the 
special law, applicable only to the City of Norfolk approved in 
1896. The Court said that this position was not tenable. And 
then added: 
"It is a principle that a general statute, without negative 
words, will not repeal by implication from their repugnancy, 
the provisio~s of a former one which is special or local, un-
less there is something in the general law, or in the course 
of legislation on the subject matter, that makes it. manifest 
that the Legislature contemplated and intended a repeal. When 
the legislator frames a statute in general terms, or treats a 
:Subject in a general manner, it is not reasonable to suppose 
that he intends to abrogate particular legislation to the de-
tails of which he had previously given his attention, applicable 
.to a part of the sa1ne subject, unless the general act shows 
a plain intention to do so,'' 
citing Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Section 157. The 
Court then approves a statement made in the opinion in the 
case last cited above in the following words: 
''The well-settled doctrine derived from all authorities is 
that laws special and local in their application, are not re-
pealed by general legislation, except upon the clearest mani-
festation of an intent by the Legislature to effect such repeal, 
and, ordinarily, an express repeal by some intelligible refer-
ence to the special act is necessary to accomplish that end.'' 
In Orange, etc., Rail,road Company v. Alexandria, 17 Gratt. 
176, this Court said: 
"It is undoubtedly true, as held by this Court in City of 
Richmond v. Daniel, 14 Gratt. :387, that laws conferring the 
power of taxation upon a municipal corporation are to be 
construed strictly. But so; too, are exemptions from taxation 
to be construed strictly, and when the power of taxation has 
been once conferred, it is not to be crippled or destroyed by 
strained interpretations of subsequent laws. It must be sus-
tained in its full extent under the original grant, until 
abridged or taken away by a clear expression of legislative 
will.'' 
In SouJth rt We.ste1·n Railroad Corn,pany v. The Co1n-mon-
wealth, 104 Virginia at 321, the Court discusses the rule of 
construction that all statutes in par-i in.ateria should be read 
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' and construed together as if they formed parts of the same 
statute and were enacted at the same time. This rule, it is 
said, applies with peculiar force in the construction of a Code 
to the several parts thereof which relate to the same subject: 
matter, were conceived by the same minds, prepared by the 
same hands, and adopted at the same time by the same legis-
lative body. This rule has peculiar force with reference to 
the consideration of Sections 192 and 437 of the Tax Code to 
which reference has been made above. The Court, in the case 
last. cited, then says: 
''Another rule of construction is that where there are two 
statutes, the <~arlier special and the later general-the terms 
of the general broad enough to include the matter provided 
for in the special-the fact that one is special and the other 
general creates a presumption that the special is to be con-
sidered as remaining an exception to the general, and that 
the general will not be considered as repealing the special 
unle~s the provisions of the general are manifestly inconsist-
ent with those of the special." 
In the case at bar there is a conflict between the charter 
of the city, a special law, and Section 192 of the Tax Code, a 
general law. But Section 192 could not have the effect of re-
pealing the special act when Section 437 of the Tax Code ex-
pressly prevents such repeal. 
The same principles are laid down in Eureka Club v. The 
Commonwealth, 105 Virginia 564, 'vhere it is said that it is 
a reasoi].able presumption that the Legislature did not intend 
to effect so important a measure as the repeal of a law with-
out expressing an intention to do so, and that such interpreta-
tion would not be adopted unless it was inevitable. 
In the case of Scott v. Lichford, 164 Virginia 419, this Court 
said, quoting from McQuillin on Municipal Corporations : 
"A later statute which is general does not repeal a former 
one that is particular unless negative words are used, or the 
acts are so entirely inconsiste11:t that they cannot stand to-
gether. Thus laws existing for the benefit of particular 
municipalities ordinarily are not repealed by general laws re-
lating· to the subject-matter. Stated in different phrase,. 
where the subsequent general law and prior special law, char-
ter or ordinance provisions do not conflict, they both stand, 
but this result must depend, of course, upon the legislative 
intent which is to be ascertained from an examination and 
com.pari~on of the whole course of legislation relating to the 
subject under consideration.'' _ 
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In view of these authorities it would seem to be clear that 
the provisions of the charter of the City of Petersburg were 
not repealed upon the enactment of the Tax Code, particu-
larly Sections 192 and 437 thereof. The provisions of the 
charter of the city were further preserved by Sectjon 117 of 
the Constitution and by the other constitutional and statutory 
provisions referred to above. · 
The authorities from States other than Virginia are col-
lected in 59 C. J., at pages 935 and 936 and at page 1056. These. 
authorities are further collected in 43 C. J., at page 159 and at 
page 172. 
The subject of repeal of special or local laws by g·eneral 
acts is treated in 25 R. C. L., at page 927, where it is stated 
that the general rule is that a general statute does not repeal 
a special statute unless the purpose so to do is clearly mani-
fest, and that a later statute, general in its terms and not 
expressly repealing a prior special statute, 'vould ordinarily 
not affect the. special provisions of the earlier statute. 
The third reason for the invaliditv of the assessment as-
serted in the application (R., p. 4) is ·that the ordinance is in-
valid and unenforceable because it '!iolates the provisions of 
Sections 11 and 168 of the Constitution of Virginia and the 
14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. 
While this contention was not waived in the Court below, it 
was not discussed in the briefs filed. 
The right of the city to impose a license tax, unless that 
right has been revoked by effective or appropriate legislation, 
is clear. No question of deprivation of property without due 
process of law, or of denial of equal protection of laws, or 
of the abridging of privileges and immunities of citizens of 
the United States is involved in this case, if the city has the 
riglit to levy the tax. If it has no right to levy the tax be-
cause of the other reasons assigned, the tax is invalid. There-
fore, Section 11 of the Virginia Constitution and the 14th 
Amendment to the Federal Constitution would seem to have 
no place in this discussion. 
Section 168 of the Virginia Constitution relates to uni-
formity of taxation. It is well established that this section 
applies only to a direct tax on property and not to license 
taxes. Bradley v. Riahrnond, 110 Virginia 521. The tax here 
is uniform upon the subjects of each class under the or-
dinance, ( 1) those who keep a regular place of business, and 
(2) those who do not. The relevancy of this section of the 
Constitution does not appear. 
Your petitioner, therefore, prays that a 'vrit of error may 
be awarded it: tl~at the order of the Hustings Court of the City 
of Petersburg, entered on the third day of May, 1937, may be 
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revoked and reversed; that final judgment may be entered; 
and that your petitione:r; may have such other relief as the 
nature of this case may require. And it will ever pray, etc. 
1\tiay process issue. 
THE CITY OF PETERSBURG, 
A 1\iunicipal Corporation. 
By: J. GORDON BOHANNAN, 
Its Attorney. 
We, J. Gordon Bohannan and Willis W. Bohannan, attor-
neys at la,v, practicing in the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
Virginia, do certify that in our opinion the order complained 
of in the foregoing petition should be reviewed and reversed. 
J. GORDON BOHANNAN, 
WILLIS W. BOHANNAN. 
Petersburg, Virginia, July 6th, 1937. 
A copy of this petition was mailed to Christian, Barton and 
Parker, counsel for General Baking Company, Incorporated, 
in the trial Court on the 6th day of July, 1937 
Received July 7, 1937. 
J. GORDON BOHANNAN, 
Counsel for the Petitioner. 
M. B. W. 
Writ of error granted, stttpe.rsedea.s awarded. No bond re-
quired. 
EDW. W. HUPGINS. 
7/23/37. 
' .. 
Received July 23, 1937. 
M.B. W. · 
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RECORD 
VIRGINIA: 
.In the Hustings Court of the City of Petersburg. 
General Baking Company, Incorporated,· Complainant, 
v. 
City of Petersburg, Defendant. 
State of Virginia, 
. ~ City of Petersburg, to-wit: 
I, Robert G. Bass, Clerk of said Court, do hereby certify 
that before· ·applying for a transcript of the record in the 
above-styled ·case, the defendant (City of Petersburg), by its 
attorney, gave written notice to the complainant's attorneys 
of its intention so to do, which said notice is on file with the 
·papers in my office. 
Given under my hand this 12th day of May,"1937. 
ROBERT G. BASS, Clerk. 
Pleas at the Courthouse of the said City of Petersburg, be-
fore the Hustings Court of the said City, on the 12th day of 
May, 1937. 
Be it remembered that theretofore, to-wit: In the Clerk's 
Office of the said Court, on the 8th day of July, 1935, there 
was filed and docketed in the said Clerk's Office a certain 
''Petition and Answer" for relief from an Erroneous Assess-
ment ·of a Local License Tax, which said Petition 
page 2 ~ and Answer are in the words and figures following, 
to-wit: 
PETITION. 
To the Honorable R. T. Wilson, Judge of said Court: 
The applicant, General Baking Company, respectfully rep-
resents: 
1. That it is a corporation organized under the laws of 
the State of New York, and doing business in the State of 
Virginia under a certificate of authority obtained from the 
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State Corporation Commission in accordance with the statutes 
of said State; that it owns and operates a larg·e manufacturing 
plant in Norfolk, Virginia, where it produces and manufac-
tures bakery products which it sells in Norfolk and elsewhere 
in the State of Virginia, including the City of Petersburg; 
that it is a rnanufacturer taxable on capital by the State of 
Virginia; 
2. That its sales of said bakery products, to-wit, bread and 
cakes, in the City of Petersburg are conducted in this wise-
applicant's said bakery products, being family supplies of a 
perishable nature produced by it and not purchased by it 
for sale, are shj_pped daily by the applicant from its manu-
facturing establishment in Norfolk to the City of Richmond 
in the truck or trucks of applicant and upon arrival in the 
City of Richmond said ba:kery products are transferred from 
the larger trucks of applicant to smaller trucks owned by 
applicant and operated by its agents and employees who 
transport said bakery products to the City of Petersburg and 
there carry them from place to place and offer for sale, sell 
and deliver at the time of sale the said- bakery prod-
page 3 } ucts, includin~ bread and cakes, from the said 
smaller trucks directly to consumers in said City 
of Petersburg and adjoining territory; that applicant does 
not keep a regular place of business in the City of Petersburg, 
open at all times in reg'Ular business hours; and at the same 
place; 
3. That applicant has been assessed with a license tax of 
$150.00 in accordance with the provisions of an ordinance of 
the said City of Petersburg adopted December 18, 1934, in the 
following words and figures, to-wit: 
AN ORDINANCE FOR IMPOSING AND COLLECTING 
LICENSE TAXES ON PERSONS, FIRMS OR COR-
PORATIONS WHO OFFER FOR SALE OR SELL, 
AND AT THE TI~IE OF SUCH SALE DELIVER, 
BREAD, CAKES, PIES, ICE CREAM AND OR CON-
FECTIONERY PRODUCTS TO DEALERS OR CON-
SUMERS IN THE CITY OF PETERSBURG, FOR 
THE YEAR BEGINNING JANUARY 1, 1935, .AND 
FOR EACII YEAR THEREAFTER. 
BE IT ORDAINED by the Council of the City of Peters-
burg, in manner following: 
All persons, firms or corporations engaged in the occupa-
tion or business named below, for the year beginning J anu-
ary 1, 1935, and for each year_ thereafter, shall obtain from 
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the Commissioner of the Revenue a license for the same, the 
annual tax on which shall be assessed and collected at the 
time the license is issued, at the following rates, and paid on 
or before the First day of January of each year : 
SECTION 575-A. 
1. All persons, firms or corporations who keep a regular 
place of business in this city, open at all times i:p. regular 
business hours and at the same place, who shall carry from 
place to place and, elsewhere than at such regular place of 
business; personally, or through their agents, offer for sale 
or sell and, at the time of such sale, deliver, bread, cakes, 
pies, ice cream and/or confectionery products to dealers or 
consumers in this city, shall pay a specific licens~ tax of sixty 
dollars ($60.00), regardless of whether or not such person, 
firm or corporation has been taxed on capital by the State of 
Virginia. No pro rata. Not transferable. 
page 4 ~ 2. All persons, firms or corporations who do not 
keep a regular place of business in this city, open 
at all times in regular business hours and at the same place, 
who shall carry from place to place ana, personally or through 
their agents, offer for sale or sell, and, at the time of such 
sale, deliver, bread, cakes, pies, ice cream and/or confection-
ery products to dealers or consumers in this city, shall pay 
a specific license tax of One Hundred and Fifty Dollars 
($150.00), regardless of whether such person, firm or cor-
poration has been taxed on capital by the State of Virginia. 
No pro rata. Not transferable. 
3. The specific license tax imposed by this section shall 
be in lieu of the license tax imposed by Section 5·75 of the 
Code of the City of Petersburg as a1nended by an ordinance 
a}lptoved May 1, 1934. 
4. Any person, firm or corporation covered by this or-
dinance who shall fail to comply With the provisions thereof 
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof 
shal1 be fined 110t less than fifty dollars ($50.00) and not more 
than two hundred dollars ($200.00) foi· each offense. 
5. The general provisions of the License Otdinance of the 
City of Petersburg (Chapter .XXXVI of the Code of the City 
of Petersburg), insofar as the same q.re applicable and are 
not in conflict with this ordinance, shall be regarded as having 
been incorporated herein.'' 
4. That said assessment is erroneous and invalid and ap-
plicant is aggrieved by said assessment and has declined to 
pay the same for the followin~· reasons, among others, to-wit: 
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a. That said City of Petersburg is without charter power 
to enact such an ordinance insofar as it affects applicant; 
b. That said City of Petersburg is by reason of the pro-
visions of Sections 192 and 192b of the State Tax Code and 
amendments thereto, prohibited from imposing such a license 
tax upon applicant; . 
c. That said ordinance is invalid and unenforceable because 
it violates the provh;ions o{ Sections 11 and 168 of the Con-
stitution of Vir~dnia and the 14th Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States. 
page 5 ~ 5. ~hat said erroneous assessment was not caused 
by the wilful failure or refusal of applicant to fur-
nish the tax assessment authority with the necessary informa-
tion as required by law. 
Wherefore applicant prays in accordance with the pro-
visions o.f Section 414 of the Tax Code of Virginia, as 
amended, that said City of Petersburg· may be made party de-
fendant to this action; that the Attorney of the City of Pe-
tersburg may defend this action; that proper process may is-
sue; that this Court may order the erroneous assessment to 
be corrected arid applicant be exonerated from the payment 
thereof; and applicant will ever pray, etc. 
GENERAL BAI{ING CO~fP ANY, 
By CHRISTIAN, BARTON & PARKER, 
Counsel. 
ANSWER CITY OF PETERSBURG. 
The City of Petersburg, a municipal corporation, for answer 
to the said petition says: 
It admits the allegations of the first, second and third para-
graphs of said petition. It admits that the applicant has 
declined to pay the license tax assessed ag·ainst it, but it de-
nies that the applicant is aggrieved by the said asse~sment, 
and further denies each and all of the other allegations of 
the fourth paragraph of the said petition, all of which are 
stated as conclusions of law. It admits the allegations of 
paragraph 5 of said petition. 
And the City of Petersburg, for further answer to 
page 6 ~ the said petition, says that under its charter it is 
· '-' authorized to grant or to refuse licenses and to re-
quire taxes to be paid on such licenses to those engaged in 
the business conducted by the applicant in the manner set 
out in the second paragraph of the said petition, and that 
the net of the General Assembly of Virginia conferring this 
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power upon the ·City of Petersburg is not repealed by any pro-
vision of the Tax Code of Virginia or by any other act of the 
Gt.~neral ARsembly of Virginia, but is continued in effect by 
the provisions of the Constitution of the State of Virginia; 
that the City of Petersburg had when the said ordinance was 
adopted and now has full charter power to enact the said or~ 
dina.nca insofal~ as it affects the applicant; that it it is not pro-
hibited by Section 192 or by Section 192b of the said Tax Code 
from impo~ing E;uch lioense tax upon the applicant; that the 
said ordinance does not violate any provision of the Consti-
tution of Virginia or of the Con~titution of the .lTnitecl States; 
that the said tax is lawfully hnposed. and that the said ap-
pliqant is not entitled to the relief prayed for. 
CITY 0.1~, PETERSBURG, 
A Municipal Corporation. 
By J, GORDON BOHANNAN, 
Acting City Attorney. 
And at another day, to-wit: In sa,.id Court on the 3rd day 
of M&y, 1937. · 
page 7 ~ This cause came on to be heard this day upon the 
application of General Baking Company for relief 
from an erroneous assessme·nt of a local license tax imposed 
on it by the City of Petersburg by an ordinance adopted De-
cember 18, 1934, filed after due notice to the City of Peters-
burg; upon the answer of the City of Petersburg, by its at-
torney, he having appe·ared and defended the application; 
said application and petition were thereupon docketed; and 
the Commissioner of Revenue making the assessment having 
been examined as a witness touching ·the application; and 
was argued by counsel. 
The Conrt having taken the matter under consideration, 
and it appearing to the Court that the said alleged erroneous, 
invalid and void assessment was not caused by the failure or 
1•efusal of the petitioner to furnish the tax assessment au-
thority with the necessary information and that the assess.-
ment of the license tax against the petitioner is erroneous 
and invalid and that consequently the prayer of the peti-
tioner should be granted, it is ordered that General Baking 
Company be and is here}Jy exonerated from the payment of 
said license tax and it ia further ordered that a certified copy 
of this order be delivered by the Clerk of this Court to the 
Commissioner of Revenue and the Treasurer of the City of 
Petersburg; and that the City of Petersburg do pay the costs 
of this ·proceeding. -
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The Court doth certify that the facts proved are those al-
leg·ed ·in the first, second, third and fifth paragraphs of the 
application which are admitted by the answer to be true and 
correct. 
'The City of Petersburg, having indicated a desire to pre-
sent to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia a 
page 8 ~ petition for a writ of error and S1£persedeas to this 
order, the execution of this order is suspended for 
the period of sixty (60) days from this date, and thereafter 
until such petition is acted on by the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals, if such petition is actually filed within such period of 
sixty (60) days, when the said City or someone for it shall 
have given or filed a bond in the Clerk's Office of this Court, 
with surety to be approved by the Clerk thereof, in the pen-
alty of $50.00, conditioned according to law. 
State of Virginia, 
City of Petersburg, to-wit: 
I, Robert G. Bass, Clerk of the Hustings Court of the City 
of Petersburg, in the State of Virginia, do hereby certify that 
the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the record 
and proceedings in the case now pending in the said Court 
under the style of ''General Baking Company, Incorporated, 
Complainant, against City of Petersburg, Defendant", as I 
was ·directed to transcribe. 
Given under my hand this 12th day of May, 1937. 
ROBERT G. BASS, Clerk. 
Fee for this transcript $5.00. 
A Copy-Teste : 
~L B. WATTS, C. C. 
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